Greek city v. Galloway , 572 US ___ (2014), is the case of the United States Supreme Court where the court ruled that the Greek City of New York may allow volunteer volunteers to open every legislative session with prayer. The plaintiffs are Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, represented by the United States for the Separation of Church and State. They argue that prayer violates the Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided against the city, and on May 20, 2013 the Supreme Court agreed to decide on the matter. On May 5, 2014, the US Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in favor of the Greek City, and that city practice initiated a legislative session with a prayer did not violate the First Amendment's Clause of Establishment.
Video Town of Greece v. Galloway
Quest before trial
Does the Greek city of New York enforce the unlawful religious stance by opening monthly council meetings with prayer?
Maps Town of Greece v. Galloway
Court decision
The majority opinion
With a 5-4 vote, the Court ruled that city practice does not violate the Establishment Clause. The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy states: "The Greek city does not violate the First Amendment by opening its meetings with prayers that are consistent with our tradition and not forcing participation by unbelievers." The Court concluded that the practice of the city to open its city council meeting with the prayers offered by members of the clergy did not violate the Clause of Establishment when the practice was consistent with a tradition long followed by state congress and legislature, the city did not discriminate against religious minorities in determining who could offering prayer, and prayer does not force participation with the disobedient.
Majority states that sectarian prayer in government meetings is permissible under the Constitution. "To hold that prayers should be non-sectarian will force the legislature to sponsor prayers and the courts decide these cases to act as overseers and censors of religious speeches," Kennedy wrote for himself and conservative members in court. Lawmakers and judges have instead resorted to police prayer, he writes, involving "the government in matters of religion at a much greater level than those under present city practices for not editing or approving previous prayers or criticizing their content after the fact. " This means that prayers are permitted to apply for certain religious affiliations without violating the First Amendment ban against religious support at the federal, state or local level.
Kennedy stated that the US Constitution does not require the Greek city to seek outside the city for pastors of other religions as long as the city maintains a non-discriminatory policy. But he includes refraining from legislative prayer by stating that "[t] he aim of legislative prayer is to lend gravity" to a session in which "divisive affairs of government" will take place. Noting that the legislative prayer (in this context) should be "serious and respectful in tone," Kennedy goes on to state that when legislative prayer is used as an opportunity to condemn or try to convert people who are not members of a particular religion, these prayers will be in accordance with the Constitution. He adds in general: "The absence of a pattern of prayer that from time to time demean, instigate, or betray the objectives of a forbidden government, a challenge based purely on the content of a particular prayer would not constitute constitutional violation."
Justice Kennedy writes: "Legislative bodies are not involved in unlawful coercion by simply exposing constituents to prayers they do not want to hear and where they do not need to participate." According to the majority of legislative prayers may not be allowed if they "degrade unbelievers or religious minorities, threaten the curse, or preach conversion," or if the prayer is chosen in a discriminatory way of religion.
Concurrent opinion
Justice Thomas wrote in his separate opinion (partly united by Justice Scalia) that the case should be rejected because the Formation Clause does not apply to states and subdivisions, but only to Congress. He also stated that the Constitution would only be violated if "actual legal force" such as forcing taxes to pay for church use. Judge Alito wrote a separate, separate opinion (partly united by Judge Scalia) in which he dealt with the points raised by Judge Kagan in disagreement. In Alito's view, "the logical impulse of many [Justice Kagan's] arguments is that prayer is never allowed before a meeting of local government legislatures."
Disagreements
Justice Breyer posed dissent focused on the facts of the case and argued that the city should do more to make its legislative prayer inclusive with other religions.
The main differences of opinion were written by Justice Kagan and joined Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor. Kagan notes three major differences between the case before the court and Marsh (1983):
- The Greek City Council is not only a legislative body, but also a place where local government interacts with the local population.
- The prayers in Greece are not addressed to MPs, but also to locals who want to do business with the government.
- The prayers in Greece are sectarian.
Taking note of these differences, Kagan writes: "So month after month for more than a decade, prayers soaked in one faith, addressed to community members, starting meetings to discuss local affairs and distributing government benefits.In my view, the practice is inconsistent with the First Amendment's promise that every citizen, irrespective of his religion, has a common part in his government. "Kagan's need to give equal treatment would be easy: city council members can tell pastors that prayers should not denominational, or they may invite pastors of all different religions to offer prayers, rather than focusing almost exclusively on Christians. minister. However, the city does not use any of these steps.
Reaction to rule
Reactions to court decisions vary greatly. Conservative Christians and others who feel that religious expression has been too restricted in public settings are happy with the decision. Eric Rassbach, vice general counsel of Dana Becket for Religious Freedom, called the court's decision "a major victory for religious freedom." Along with their supporters, Jewish women and atheists who filed a lawsuit against the Greek city were disappointed by the court's verdict. A number of Jewish organizations, including the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Pollution League, have filed an amici curiae brief to support the respondents, and expressed disappointment at the majority's decision. Secular groups are also disappointed. Daniel Mach, director of the ACLU Program on Freedom of Religion and Belief, said: "We are disappointed with today's decision Favorite favoritism of religion should be banned under the Constitution The city-sponsored sectarian protocol violates the ground rules that oblige governments to remain neutral on the issue of faith. "Ira Lupu, a professor of emeritus law at George Washington University who specializes in the First Amendment, called the court decision" a very bad decision "for eroding the Establishment Clause. Lupu explained that the court's decision "does not demand anything [...] reasonable efforts to create non-sects or to encourage diversity." The majority of beliefs in a particular community can dictate prayer and religious minorities can be abandoned if they do not step up and say, 'Hey, how about us? ' "
The Los Angeles Times shows that the decision to divide judges along religious lines, as well as ideologues. The five supreme judges in the majority are Catholics, and three of the four who disagree are Jews.
The constitutional recipe for legislative prayer
According to Lyle Denniston, the constitutional prescription for legislative prayer is based on eight factors. These factors are:
- Legislative prayers are not limited to meetings of state congresses or legislatures, but may also be read out in more intimate and intimate local government meeting arrangements.
- The prayer part of the meeting should be made only during the ceremonial session of the session of the government body, not mixed with action on official policy.
- The body can invite anyone in the community to give a prayer and (if you have money) can have a paid pastor. Officials in the body can also join in prayer by bowing their heads or showing other signs of religious devotion, such as crossing themselves.
- The body should not dictate what is in prayer and what may not be in prayer. Prayer can call upon a god or a god of a given faith, and need not embrace the beliefs of many or all religions.
- In allowing "sectarian" prayers, limbs should not "apostatise" ie promote one faith as true faith, and may not require people of different faith preferences, or unbelievers, to take part, and not criticize them if they do not take part.
- Sectarian "prayers" may not underestimate or discriminate against a particular faith, but officials need not make extra effort to ensure that all religions are represented in a prayer session - even if it means one religion ends as the dominant message.
- Such prayer is permissible when most, if not all, of the audience consists of adults.
- A court, in hearing the challenge of prayer practice, is limited to examining the "pattern of prayer," and has no authority to guess the contents of individual prayer words. In assessing such a pattern, the proper test is not whether it tends to raise most of the beliefs of one faith, but whether it has the effect of forcing an individual who does not share that faith.
See also
- Marsh v. Chambers : holds that the practice of hiring a minister for the state legislature of Nebraska does not violate the First Amendment Establishment Clause
- Mouvement laÃÆ'¯que quÃÆ' Â © bÃÆ' Â © cois v Saguenay (City) : a similar Canadian case
References
External links
- Oyez: Greek city v. Galloway
- Greek city v. Galloway in SCOTUSblog
- Greek city v. Galloway: Deep Dive in Oyez
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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