" Sharization " or " Islamization " (Urdu: ?????????? ) is the "main", or "center" policy of the government of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq , the ruler of Pakistan from 1977 until his death in 1988. Zia is also called "the man most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam".
The Pakistan Movement has gained state independence from the British Empire as a Muslim-majority country. At the time of its founding, the Dominion of Pakistan had no official state religion before 1956, when the constitution had declared it to be the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Nevertheless, no religious law had been adopted for government and protocol of the judiciary and civil administration, until the mid-1970s with the arrival of General Muhammad Zia Ul-Haq in a military coup also known as Operation Fair Play which dumped Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali. Bhutto.
Zia-ul-Haq is committed to enforcing its interpretation of the Nizam-e-Mustafa ("Rule of the prophet" Muhammad), to establish an Islamic state and to enforce the law.
Zia established a separate Shariat judicial court and a court bench to prosecute legal cases using Islamic doctrine. New criminal offenses (adultery, fornication, and religious defamation), and new punishment (caning, amputation and stoning to death), are added to Pakistani law. Interest payments for bank accounts are replaced with "profit and loss" payments. Zakat charitable donation to 2.5% annual tax. School textbooks and libraries are overhauled to remove un-Islamic material. Offices, schools and factories are required to offer a prayer room. Zia supports the influence of Islamic scholars and Islamic parties, while conservative scholars become television equipment. 10,000 activists from the Jamaat-e-Islami party were appointed to government posts to ensure the continuation of the agenda after his death. Conservative ulama (Islamic scholars) are added to the Islamic Ideology Council.
In 1984 the referendum gave Zia and the Islamization program, 97.7% approval in the official results. However, there were protests against the law and its enforcement during and after the reign of Zia. Women's groups and human rights are opposed to the detention of rape victims under penalties, new laws that respect the testimony of women (the Law of Proof) and the compensation of blood money ( diyat ) in half of a man. Religious and human rights minorities are opposed to the "vague" blasphemy laws and "nasty abuse and arbitrary enforcement".
Possible motivations for the Islamization program include Zia's personal piety (most accounts agree that he is from a religious family), a desire to gain political allies, to "fulfill" raison d'etre Pakistan "as a Muslim country, and/or political need to legitimize what some Pakistanis see as "a repressive and unrepresentative military emergency regime".
The degree to which Zia's success has strengthened Pakistan's national cohesion with the state-sponsored Islamization of Islamization. Sunni-Shiite religious riots broke out because of differences in Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh ) - in particular, about how Zakat donations will be distributed. There are also differences among Sunni Muslims.
Video Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization
Background and history
Pakistan was founded on the basis of securing a sovereign homeland for Muslims on the continent to live in self-determination.
The notion of Pakistan has received tremendous popular support among British Indian Muslims, especially those in the Presidency and the provinces of British India where Muslims are in a minority like U.P. Muslim League leaders, clerics (Islamic scholars) and Jinnah have articulated their Pakistan vision in terms of the Islamic state. Muhammad Ali Jinnah has developed a close relationship with the ulama. When Jinnah died, Islamic cleric Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani described Jinnah as the greatest Muslim after Emperor Mughal Aurangzeb and also compared Jinnah's death with the death of the Prophet. Uthman asked the Pakistanis to remember Jinnah's message of Unity, Faith and Discipline and work to fulfill his dream:
to create a solid bloc of all Muslim countries from Karachi to Ankara, from Pakistan to Morocco. He [Jinnah] wants to see Muslims in the world united under the banner of Islam as an effective check against the aggressive design of their enemies.
The first formal step taken to turn Pakistan into an ideological Islamic state was in March 1949 when the country's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, introduced the objective resolution in the Constituent Assembly. The objective resolution states that sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God the Almighty. Muslim League President Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman announces that Pakistan will unite all Muslim countries into Islamistan - a pan-Islamic entity. Khaliq believes that Pakistan is only a Muslim country and not yet an Islamic state, but it can be an Islamic state after bringing all those who believe in Islam into a political unit. Keith Callard, one of the earliest scholars on Pakistani politics, observes that Pakistanis believe in the essential unity of purpose and worldview in the Muslim world:
Pakistan was established to advance the goals of Muslims. Other Muslims may be expected to be sympathetic, even enthusiastic. But it is assumed that other Muslim countries will take the same view of the relationship between religion and nationality.
However, Pakistani pan-Islamist sentiments were not shared by other Muslim governments at the time. Nationalism in other parts of the Muslim world is based on ethnicity, language and culture. Although the Muslim government is not sympathetic to Pakistan's pan-Islamic aspirations, Islamists from around the world are drawn to Pakistan. Figures such as the Great Mufti of Palestine, Al-Haj Amin al-Husseini, and leaders of the Islamic political movement, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, became frequent visitors to the country. After General Zia-ul-Haq took power in a military coup, Hizb ut-Tahrir (an Islamist group calling for the establishment of the Caliphate) expanded its network and organizational activities in Pakistan. Its founder, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, will maintain regular correspondence with Abul A'la Maududi, founder of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), and he also urges Dr. Israr Ahmed to continue his work in Pakistan for the formation of a global caliphate.
Social scientist Nasim Ahmad Jawed conducted a survey in 1969 in Pakistan that was previously divided on the type of national identity used by educated professionals. He found that over 60% of people in East Pakistan (modern Bangladesh) claim to have a secular national identity. However, in West Pakistan (now Pakistan), the same figure claimed to have an Islamic identity rather than a secular one. In addition, the same figure in East Pakistan defines their identity in terms of their ethnicity and not Islam. But on the contrary in West Pakistan where Islam is declared more important than ethnicity.
After Pakistan's first general election, the 1973 Constitution was made by an elected Parliament. The Constitution declares Pakistan the Islamic Republic and Islam as a state religion. He also stated that all laws must be adapted to Islamic orders as contained in the Qur'an and Sunnah and that no law is contrary to such a command can be applied. The 1973 Constitution also created certain institutions such as the Shari'a Court and the Islamic Ideology Council to channel the interpretation and application of Islam.
On 5 July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq led a coup. In the year or two before Zia-ul-Haq's coup, his predecessor, the leftist Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, has faced strong opposition united under the banner of the revivalist Nizam-e-Mustafa ("Rule of the prophet "). According to the supporters of the movement, establishing an Islamic state based on sharia law will mean a return to justice and the success of the early days of Islam when the prophet of Islam Muhammad ruled the Muslims. In an effort to stem the flow of Islamization of the streets, Bhutto has also called for and forbade drinking and selling wine by Muslims, nightclubs and racetracks.
When in power, Zia went further than Bhutto, committed to enforcing the law of Nizam-e-Mustafa , ie shariah . Most accounts assert that Zia is from a religious and religious family plays an important role in shaping his personality. His father worked as a civil servant at the army headquarters and was known as '' Maulvi '' Akbar Ali because of his religious devotion. Zia-ul-Haq joined the army before separating and occasionally offended his British superiors with his refusal to abandon the religious and cultural traditions. Zia attributes her personal resistance to the British Indian cavalry lifestyle to her faith in God and her teachings. ''
In his first televised speech to the country as head of state he declared it
Pakistan created in the name of Islam will continue to survive only if it holds on Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of an Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.
While in the past, "many rulers did what they liked in the name of Islam," he would not.
Unlike in Iran, Islamization in Pakistan is politically conservative, working against, not with leftist forces and ideas. Zia has little sympathy with Bhutto or his populist socialist philosophy - captured in the slogan, " Food, clothing, and shelter ." General Zia explained in an interview in 1979 given to British journalist Ian Stephens:
The basis of Pakistan is Islam.... Muslims of the subcontinent are separate cultures. Being in the Two-Nations Theory that this part is carved from Subcontinent as Pakistan.... The way Bhutto develops in this Society is by eroding her moral fiber.... by throwing students against teachers, children against their parents, landlords against tenants, workers against factory owners. [Pakistan has economic difficulties] because Pakistanis are made to believe that one can earn income without working.... We will return to Islam not by choice but by the power of the situation. It was not me or my government that forced Islam. That's what 99 percent of people want; street violence against Bhutto reflects the wishes of the people...
When Zia started the Islamization program, he was attacked by a conservative Sunni troop who thought the process was too slow. He kept himself away from some scholars in 1980, and in 1983 the religion was spreading rumors that Zia was an Ahmadi. Zia "is forced to deny this allegation openly and denounce Ahmadiyya as the infidels (infidels)".
In 1984 a referendum was held in Zia, the Islamization program, and gave him a five-year presidency. Official results reported 97.7 support and voter turnout of 60%. Independent observers question whether 30% of eligible voters have chosen.
The opposition to Islamization or the state-sponsored aspect came from several circles. Religious unrest broke out in 1983 and 1984. The sectarian divide between Sunni and Shiite worsened the issue of the 1979 law of Zakat, but differences in fiqh fiqh also arose in marriage and divorce. , inheritance and wills and the imposition of hadd penalties.
Among Sunni Muslims, there is a dispute between Deobandis and Barelvis. Zia likes the Deobandi doctrine and Sufi discs from Sindh (the Barelvi) joining the anti-Zia Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.
Maps Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization
Hudood Law
One of the first and most controversial measures of Islamization was the replacement of a section of the Pakistan Criminal Code (PPC) with the "Hudood Ordinance 1979". (Hudood means limits or restrictions, as within the limits of acceptable behavior in Islamic law.) Ordinance adds new criminal offenses to adultery and adultery with Pakistani law, and new punishment whips, amputations, and stoning to death.
For theft or robbery, a prison or prison PPC punishment, or both, is replaced by the right-handed amputation of the offender for theft, and the amputation of the right hand and left foot for robbery. For Zina (sex outside marriage) the provisions relating to adultery are replaced by Ordinance with the whiping of 100 whips for unmarried offenders, and the punishment of stoning to death for married offenders.
All of these Hudood penalties are the maximum sentence, depending on the evidence Hudd - four well-known Muslim men testify as witnesses of crime-are fulfilled. In practice, by 2014, Hudd's requirements have not been met and none of the perpetrators have been stoned or their limbs amputated by the Pakistani court system. The less restrictive tazir standards - in which the punishment is a combination of imprisonment, fines and/or whips - are applied and many offenders have been publicly flogged.
More worrying for human rights and women's rights advocates, some lawyers and politicians, is the arrest of thousands of rape victims with allegations of adultery . Mixing Pakistan's correctional code with Islamic law is difficult because of the differences in the logic underlying both legal systems.
Prohibition
"Drinking wine" (and all other alcoholic beverages) is not a crime under the original Pakistan Criminal Code, but in 1977, drinking and selling wine by Muslims was banned in Pakistan, sentenced to six months imprisonment or a fine of Rs. 5000/-, or both. Under the Prohibition of Zia Prohibition, this punishment was replaced by one of the eighty lines whipping, (quoting an Ijma (consensus opinion) from Muhammad's companions since the second Caliph Umar period). Non-Muslims are exempted if they obtain a license to drink and/or produce alcoholic beverages from the Government.
Adultery Act (Zina)
The most controversial of the ordinance is the Ordinance of Zina , in which the provisions of the Pakistani Criminal Code relating to adultery are replaced. Women and men found guilty must be flogged a hundred lines if not married, and stoned to death if married. Testimonies not recognized by women are unacceptable in hudood crimes, so in cases of rape, victims are sometimes accused of adultery and imprisonment and their rapists are released because women can not meet Hadd's requirements from four prominent Muslim men who testify the crime. Girls as young as 12 years old are sometimes also imprisoned and charged for unlawful relationships because the law abolished the rape laws in Pakistan.
According to law scholar Martin Lau,
While it is easy to file a case against a woman who accuses her of committing adultery, the Zina Act makes it extremely difficult for a woman to get a guarantee while awaiting trial. Worse, in actual practice, the majority of women accused of being found guilty by court courts are only to be released on appeal to the Federal Shari'a Court. By then they had spent years in prison, ostracized by their families, and had become social outcasts.
In 1979, before the ordinance came into effect, there were 70 women detained in Pakistani prisons. In 1988, there were 6000. Critics complained that the law had become the way for "vengeful husbands and parents" to punish their wives or daughters for disobedience, but "whenever even minor changes" were put forward, religious groups and political parties were staged " large-scale demonstrations "in opposition.
Pakistan's women's and human rights groups are protesting the law, and international media give it publicity. Proponents defend the punishment of 'Ordinances' as fated by God and the law as victims of "very unfair propaganda" in the media.
The first conviction and stoning to death, in September 1981, was reversed under national and international pressure. The belief in the adultery of a 13-year-old blind girl (Safia Bibi), who was allegedly raped by her employer and her son, was reversed and the conviction was set aside to appeal after fierce public criticism. Other convictions for adultery and the penalty of stoning to death in early 1988 sparked public anger and led to retrial and release by the Sharia Federal Court.
Attention to the problematic nature of the Ordinance and the suggestions to revise it were given by a number of government-appointed commissions and a few weeks of televised television debate on the subject. In 2006, sections of the law were extensively revised by the Women's Protection Bill.
Sharia Court and constitutional amendments
In 1978 Zia established the "Shariat Appellate Benches", "grafted" to the four Pakistani High Courts. The benches are assigned to assess legal cases using the teachings of the Qur'an and Sunnah, and examine the laws of the state to determine whether they obey sharia law, and bring them into harmony if they do not. A Appendate Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court was created to be the ultimate authority in cases of Sharia .
In announcing the establishment of Shariat Benches, Zia describes their jurisdiction:
"Every citizen shall have the right to present the law imposed by the government before the 'Sharia Bench' and obtain his verdict whether the law is entirely or partly Islamic or un-Islamic."
However, some very important laws are exempt from un-Islamic allegations.
The Ninth Amendment of the Constitution of Pakistan, added by the Zia government, states that "The Islamic orders as set forth in the Holy Quran and Sunnah shall be the supreme law and source of guidance for legislation", but qualify that in Article 203-B by disregarding rules: the constitution, "Muslim Personal Law, any law relating to the procedure of the Court or the court", and "until the expiry of ten years from the commencement of this Chapter, any fiscal or statutory law relating to the collection and collection of taxes and fees or practices or banking or insurance procedures... "So the constitution and the main part of Pakistani law are exempt from Sharia jurisdiction. Furthermore, Shariat Benches does not always follow Zia's policies, and from the very beginning declared rajm , or stoning, to be un-Islamic. Zia-ul-Haq rearranged the court, which later ruled the Islamic rajm.
In 1980, the Shariat Appeal benches were disbanded and replaced by the Federal Shariat Court (FSC). Its stance was not clean and simple, between 1980 and 1985, "the provisions relating to the FSC operation were modified 28 times, through the mechanism of 12 separate presidential regulations and incorporated into the Constitution in 14 sub-sections covering 11 pages of text." It has eight judges who was appointed by the president, "elected to most of the high court judges".
The judges of the superior court appointed by General Zia tend to be "moderate Islam" rather than "Islamic activists" who support the rapid progress of Islamization.
In the lower district courts, there is "much variation in the enforcement and interpretation of Hudood's laws", with "more enthusiasm" for its application in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP) urban than in other areas.
Religious defamation laws
To ban religious defamation, the Pakistan Criminal Code (PPC) and Criminal Procedure Code (CRPC) were amended through ordinance in 1980, 1982 and 1986.
- The 1980 law prohibits insulting statements against Islamic figures, and carries a sentence of three years in prison.
- In 1982 a small minority of Ahmadiyya religions were barred from saying or implying that they were Muslims.
- In 1986 stated something that implies disrespect to the Prophet of Islam Muhammad, Ahl al-Bayt (a member of Muhammad's family), friend (Sahabat Muhammad) or Sha 'ar-i-Islam (Islamic symbols), made a felony to blame, punished by imprisonment or fine, or both.
Breach and religious penalty
Legal language that prohibits religious defamation is complete, states
Anyone, with a deliberate intention to injure a person's religious feelings, utter a word or make any sound in a person's trial or make any movements in that person's view or place any object in the person's eyes, will be punished by one of the descriptions for a term that can be extended for up to a year, or well, or with both.
Before 1986, only 14 cases related to religious blasphemy were reported in Pakistan. From 1987 to 2014 more than 1300 people have been accused of blasphemy, mostly non-Muslim religious minorities. Most of the allegations were filed because of desecration of the Koran.
The law is controversial among Pakistan's small liberal communities and international human rights organizations. According to one religious minority source, allegations of defamation of religion generally accuse defendants, police, lawyers and judges of harassment, threats, attacks and riots. Critics complain that the blasphemy laws of Pakistan are "heavily used to persecute religious minorities and resolve private vendettas," but calls for change in defamation laws have been strongly opposed by parties Islam. In 2014 nobody is legally executed for religious blasphemy, but 17 people are on the death penalty for the crime, and a large number of accused or related to the matter have been killed at the hands of the masses or other vigilante violence.
More than 50 people accused of blasphemy have been killed before their respective trials are over, and prominent figures who oppose the blasphemy laws (Salman Taseer, former Punjab governor, and Shahbaz Bhatti, Federal Minister for Minorities) have been killed after urgent legal reform. Overall, since 1990, 62 people have been killed as a result of allegations of religious blasphemy. There is also at least one case of attack on non-Muslim faith listed under the religious blasphemy laws.
The depth of passion and the power of vigilantism against religious blasphemy became evident in the April 21, 1994 incident at Gujranwala where a doctor, Sajjad Farooq, was beaten, stoned, doused with kerosene and burned, and dragged through the streets tied to a motorcycle by a group of people the announcement was made on the loudspeakers of several local mosques that 'a Christian has burned a copy of the Qur'an' and that people must come forward to stone him to death. Then it is known that Farooq is not a Christian but a devout Muslim, but a man who has enemies with access to the public address system of the local mosque. By the end of 1994, complaints were filed against five persons but no arrests were made.
Economic Islamization
Zakat and Ushr Law
In the short run, the fiscal dimension of Islamization policy makes a stronger impact. Zakat tax payments, Zakat, and its agricultural partners, Ushr, are traditionally a personal obligation to Muslims in Pakistan. Together they generally represent 2.5% of annual household savings and are presented as a kind of wealth tax to be redistributed to poor Muslims. One of the provisions of the 1973 constitution has been established that this tax should be collected by the government. But Bhutto did not move to apply it. In 1979, Zia decided to change what was considered a personal obligation of solidarity to be a legal obligation. The "Zakat and Ushr Act" was issued on June 20, 1980. Its city component, zakat , entered into force in 1981, while ushr was not enforced until 1983. The system in which taxes this was previously collected was replaced by a special agent to rationalize the collection & amp; distribution of funds, a process that Malik describes as follows:
On the first day of the fasting month of Ramadan, Zakat Zakat Reduction (banks, post offices etc.) By deductions on source attract 2.5% of all savings accounts above certain exclusion limits (fixed at Rs 1,000 in the first year of Zakat deduction, 1980 ). They transfer Zakat so that it is collected to the Central Zakat Fund (CZF). These funds are also provided with the results of 'voluntary charity' and 'donations' and from other agencies' funds. Following certain criteria, Zakat is then distributed among the Provincial Zakat Fund (PZF) and the National Zakat Foundation (NZF). Following the specified quota, PZF hands over funds to the Local Zakat Fund (LZF), to other institutions, to the needy (mustaqhin) and to the National Zakat Foundation.
While ushr is distributed in the region where it is collected, the distribution process zakat shows the whole bureaucratic pyramid in action. Here again, Islamization policy strengthens state control over religious institutions. Further evidence of this is the Tehsil/Taluka/Sub-District and Local Committee (Elimination of the Chairman and Members) of Rule (1981), which allows the state to dismiss the president of the local Zakah Committee, an institution not previously state-dependent. In 1981, Al Zakat , the influential national monthly publications boasted that 250,000 people were involved in the new system of collecting and distributing zakat funds. The fiscal dimensions of the Zia Islamization policy foster increased sectarianism, a term which in Pakistan shows conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims. As soon as Zia's plans for zal and ushr were announced, Shia leaders objected that, according to the jurisprudence of their sect, the payment of this tax was a purely individual choice, a decision made in the conscience of a person. In reaction to the passage of the law, they organized a large-scale demonstration in Islamabad that later led to their release of compulsory taxes. The tax has not been found to have eliminated rural and urban poverty or reduced inequality in wealth that has become a traditional feature of Pakistani society. Riba
Zia openly expressed his desire to remove interest on loans and securities and create "Interest-free Economy." Zia declared that effective July 1, 1979 the affairs of the National Investment Trust, House Building Finance Corporation, and Investment Corporation of Pakistan will be run on a non-interest basis through the application of profit-loss (PLS). On January 1, 1980, about 7,000 interest free counters were opened in all nationalized commercial banks.
In 1981 interest payments had to be replaced with "profit and loss" accounts (although earnings were considered only interest under other names). The Government introduced and encouraged banks to adopt a financing scheme based on murabaha and or musharaka
Land reform
Zia does not consider land reform or trade union activity to be part of the Islamic economy. In a statement addressed to the poor and the working class, he argued:
Not for employers to provide bread, cakes, and makings (bread, clothing and houses) [reference to the famous slogan used by PPP Bhutto]. It is for God Almighty who is the provider of livelihood for his people. Believe in God and He will give you many good things in life.
His martial law also explains that "it is not committed to redistribute agrarian policy and describes land reform as ordinary politics to reward supporters and punish enemies."
When, on December 13, 1980, the Shariat Federal Court declared the land reforms of 1972 and 1977 to conform to Islamic orders, Zia responded by inaugurating three members of the Ulema (Islamic intellect) into the Shariah Federal Court and two into in the Sharia Appeals of the Supreme Court ( Ulema traditionally often comes from, or at least supports the interests of, the landowning class). The newly created tribunal reversed the FSC assessment in 1990.
After the imposition of martial law, thousands of tenants were forcibly evicted from the land in various districts.
Another source, the intellectual Charles H. Kennedy, states that from 1978 to 1992, the "Islamic Courts" established by Islamization (ie Shariah Appellate Bench and Federal Shariat Court) are far more important in land reform policies than the executive or legislature of Pakistan. Kennedy stated they effectively "stopped the implementation" of land reform, "repealed reforms, drafted new laws, and then interpreted the meaning of new laws".
Protester worker
Unions and grassroots demands for higher wages, better working conditions, social security, old age benefits and compensation for accidents, are "no justification for protests and strikes", and are treated as a nuisance to be suppressed. The maximum penalty for offenders is a jail term of three years and/or a whipping. On January 2, 1986 police killed 19 workers who broke down at Colony Textile Mill in Multan, whose management sought help from authorities.
Other Sharia Laws
Efforts are made to establish prayers five times a day.
Separate voters for Hindus and Christians were founded in 1985 - a policy originally proposed by Islamist leader Abul A'la Maududi. Christian and Hindu leaders complained that they felt excluded from the district's political process, but the policy received strong support from Islamic groups.
Qisas and Diyat Ordinance 1990
In 1990 Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance on Qisas ("revenge" or revenge) and Diyat (financial compensation paid to the heirs victim), was introduced after the Supreme Court's Supreme Court's Shariat Appeal stated that the lack of Qisas and Diyat were repugnant with the Islamic command as established by the Qur'an and Sunnah. (This law was introduced after Zia died, but by court - Shari'a Bench of Supreme Court - which Zia had created.)
Under the law, the victim (or the victim's heir) of a crime has the right to inflict injuries on perpetrators identical to those borne by the victim. (Although the regulation regulates the compensation of "blood money" for a woman half the casualty for men.) The law also allows offenders to break free from crime by paying compensation to the victim or their heirs if, and only if, the victim's family is willing to accept it.
- The Law of Evidence
A proposed Proof of Law ( Qanun-e-Shahadat ) will require two women to testify in place of one person. After protests and demonstrations against the law, the 1984 compromise limits the rules for financial transactions. According to Charles Kennedy, it is unlikely that the law will affect any case brought to high court in Pakistan because "in practice, almost every financial transaction in Pakistan by custom or rule requires some individuals."
Unlike men, women who enter into legal contracts are required to have their signature witnesses by others.
- Timing Prayer
Instructions are issued for regular prayer obedience and arrangements are made for daytime prayers (Salat Al Zuhur) in government and quasi-government offices and educational institutions, during office hours, and official functions, and at airports, train stations and bus stops.
- The Law of Ramadan
The Ordinance of Ehtram-e-Ramazan (reverence for fasting) is prohibited from eating, smoking and drinking in public places. According to this rule clause, the places include restaurants, canteens, bridges, lanes, and even the boundaries of private homes. While in the non-Muslim minority theory Pakistan is exempt from law, minorities have been arrested for eating in public.
- Regulations for women
Under Zia, a command for women to cover their heads while in public is held in public schools, colleges and state television. Women's participation in sports and performing arts is severely limited.
The Ansari Commission, which from the 1980s onwards advised the President on un-Islamic social conventions, recommended that women should be forbidden to leave the country without male counterparts and that unmarried and unaccompanied women should not be allowed to serve abroad in the diplomatic corps. Islamic dress code is imposed on women in the public eye such as news audiences and air hostesses.
Other policies
Textbooks were overhauled to remove un-Islamic material, and un-Islamic books were removed from the library. Offices, schools and factories are required to offer a prayer room; conservative clerics have become television sets. The government built mosques in rural areas, giving rural people greater access to mullahs. It also raised many mullahs to the advisory group.
According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani physicist who opposes fundamentalism, under Zia the government organizes an international conference and provides funding for research on topics such as the temperature of hell and the chemical properties of the jin (supernatural creatures created from fire).
In prison, religious instruction is mandatory. Those who can demonstrate their ability to recite the Qur'an from memory before the examination board are entitled to a remission in their sentence of up to two years.
Madrassa expansion
Educational reforms partially flow from judicial reform so far, for example, the sharia department was established at Quaid-e-Azam University in 1979 to train Islamic legal specialists. But Zia devotes personal attention to the reorganization of the Qur'anic schools ( early madaris , plural of madrasssa ). Madrasahs (traditional religious schools) in Pakistan receive state sponsorship for the first time. Their number increased from 893 to 2,801 during Zia's years according to one source. The other 12,000 countries opened from 1983-4. Most are Deobandi in doctrinal orientation, while a quarter of them are Barelvi. They receive funding from Zakat councils and provide free religious training, rooms and meals for poor Pakistanis. The schools, which banned television and radio, have been criticized by the author for sparking a good sectarian hatred between the Muslim sect and against non-Muslims.
Cultural policy
In a 1979 speech to the nation, Zia denounced Western cultural and musical influences in the country. Soon after, PTV, the national television network, stopped playing music videos or any music other than patriotic songs. Most of the cinemas in Lahore are closed. (In 2004, Pakistan's "Lollywood" film industry produces about 40 films per year, compared to thousands of Indian films.)
This is despite the warm relationship between Zia and the largest Western President (US President Ronald Reagan), and strong support for Zia from the country. Also ironic is that under Zia's rule (according to cultural critic left Nadeem F. Paracha), economic prosperity expands the country's middle and middle classes, and spreads the popularity of Western 1980's fashion, hairstyles and pop music.
Causes, criticism and sectarian division
Zia's motivation for the Islamization program has been described as including his personal piety, the desire "to meet" raison d'etre Pakistan "as a Muslim country, and the political need to legitimize what many see as Zia" a repressive military emergency regime and unrepresentative. "Zia has power overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whose opposition has united around the slogan of Nizam-e-Mustafa (Islamic government), making a supporter of Islamization of enemy of Zia's enemy.
Secular and leftist forces accuse Zia of manipulating Islam for political purposes. Nusrat Bhutto, Zulfikar's ex-wife Ali Bhutto claims that Zia "uses Islam" to ensure "the survival of his own regime" after the "1971 horrors of war" in East Bengal.
One writer pointed out that Zia is conspicuously silent on the dispute between the heterodox Zikri sect and `Ulama in Balochistan, where Islamicist doctrine will call on the conservative side of the Ulama , but where Zia has political need for tranquility among Zikri. Other notes of use of Zia Article 203-B to protect any part of the Constitution, Personal Law, and any financial law from being beaten as violating sharia law.
Division sect
How much success that Zia uses using state-sponsored Islamization to strengthen national cohesion is also disputed. The Shia Muslim minority is different from Sunni over Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). The Pakistani government is leaning in favor of applying Sunni law to all.
In particular, disputes over how Zakat donations for the poor must be distributed fanning sectarian tensions and religious riots broke out in 1983 and 1984. Shia are exempt from Zakat taxes on the grounds that they will contribute to their possession of Shi'i clerics' ah for charity work. But this exception "leads to more and more Pakistanis proclaiming themselves as Shi'a" and this phenomenon "has the effect of a hardened anti-Shia stance among Sunni Islamist activists."
Differences in fiqh jurisprudence also arise in marriage and divorce, inheritance and will and imposition of hadd punishment.
Zia-ul-Haq pursued an anti-Shia policy and attacks on Shiites also escalated under Zia's presidency, with Pakistan's first major sectarian riots broke out in 1983 in Karachi and then spreading to Lahore and Balochistan. Sectarian violence is a recurring feature of the month of Muharram every year, with sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shiites taking place in 1986 at Parachinar. In one famous incident, the Gilgit Massacre of 1988, Osama bin Laden led the Sunni tribe to attack, massacre and rape Shia civilians in Gilgit after being inaugurated by the Pakistani Army to crush the Shiite rebellion in Gilgit.
Among Sunni Muslims, Deobandis and Barelvis also have disputes. Zia loves Deobandi's doctrine and the Sufi disk of Sindh (the Barelvi) joins the anti-Zia Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.
Most of Barelvis has supported the formation of Pakistan, and Barelvi scholars have also issued a fatwa to support the Pakistan Movement during the 1946 election, but the ironic state of Islamic politics in Pakistan mostly supports Deobandi (and later Ahl-e-Hadith/Salafi) institutions. This is despite the fact that only a few (though influential) Deobandi clerics supported the Pakistan Movement. Zia-ul-Haq forms a strong alliance between the military institution and Deobandi.
The Ahmadiyas, whose members include "many leading scientists and professionals," complain that under Zia they have been "expelled from work and alleging that their possessions and mosques have been confiscated". Ahmadiyya, among its members are many prominent scientists and professionals, different from other Muslims because they do not regard Muhammad as the last prophet. They have been expelled from work and alleged that their property and mosque had been confiscated under the Zia regime.
Women's dissent
Women's groups (All Pakistan Women's Associations and Women's Action Forum) opposed the Diyat Ordinance (which regulates "blood money" compensation for female victims in half for men), and then the proposed Act for Proof (which requires two women to testify in place of one person). They challenge the law on the basis of Islam, offer an alternative interpretation of the Qur'anic verse (verse) that is used as the basis of the law, emphasizing that in other verses (verses) men and women are equal, noting the importance of witnessing the two wives of the Prophet (Hazrat Khadija and Hazrat Aisha) in early Muslim history. (Despite their arrogant refutations, protesters were met with teargas and lathi (batons) by police outside the High Court building, the cleric condemned the protest as an apostate.)
Internationally, Human Rights Watch complained that the exclusion of female testimony in cases of rape (from Hudood Ordinances (1979), as well as the proposed Evidence Law and law on Qisas and > Diyat , women are degraded into "inferior legal status" for men.
Support
Anis Ahmad of International Islamic University cheated the controversy about the "fundamentalism" of Islamization with the failure of the "Muslim elite" to understand "the divine law of divine revelation." He believes these elites have adopted the "British intellectual culture and political system" because they have used a "sociological approach" to understanding Sharia law, and to affirm that Islamic punishments such as amputations, stonings and lashes are "Bedouins", "tribes" "premodern," "harsh," "outdated" and "barbaric." He went on to argue that unlike Sharia, secularism calls for leniency against criminals, ignoring the plight of victims of crime. He believes that sexual satisfaction is not a matter of personal freedom, but "a rebellion against established moral norms in society", that the application of Sharia to non-Muslims is merely a matter of trying to "persuade them to act rationally" and that criticism of the Ahmadiyya community has made based on Munir's Report which has been "condemned by scholars [Islamic scholars]... as a biased work." Ahmad called for the development of educational institutions to include adequate information on current issues so that ijtihad could be implemented in the social, political, economic and legal fields and believed that while Zia and other politicians could be criticized for being " little and sometimes reckless "implementation," the ideals of Islam "Islamization has a" commitment "of Muslims in Pakistan.
Legacy
Islamization has been heavily criticized. Author Ian Talbot has accused it of appearing "has reduced the tradition of great faith, rich in humanity, culture and sense of social justice, to the system of punishment and mistreatment of minorities." The author (Zafar Iqbal Kalanauri) argues that Zia's interpretation of Islam may have "contributed to the rise of fundamentalism, obscurantism and regression" in Pakistan. Another authority on the topic, Christophe Jaffrelot attributes the emergence of Islamic movements including Lashkar-e-Taiba as 'undesirable consequences of Islamization policy and support for Jihad movement' perpetrated by Pakistani authorities since Zia. A description of an essay book on Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-2009 published by the Middle East Institute, summarizes the 30-year impact of Islamization beginning with Zia as, "the credo of the state's establishment is violated, many incorrect resources, and the lease of social fabric ". Under Zia's more strict Islamic rules it does not seem to lead to greater social tranquility. Crime, drinking, drug addiction is considered to have increased.
Others, at least writing in the 1980s and 1990s, thought the impact of the process was exaggerated. In 1986, New York Times journalist Steven Wiesman wrote that religious and political leaders agree that the Islamization change is "largely marginal or cosmetic." Academician Charles H. Kennedy, writing in the mid-1990s that during Zia's term "hardly a day went by where one or more program issues did not become the focus of political debate in Pakistan," during Zia's reign, the Process had a relatively small effect, because the policy "already exists", "cosmetic", or "not implemented". Kennedy's explanation of why the rhetoric of Islamization will be so wasteful while the fact is very simple is that both advocates and opponents have an incentive to exaggerate its scope and impact - by doing so it will exert its own base of political support. On the other hand, the "insiders" in charge of a functioning state, implementing Islamization have (and have) incentives to maintain stability and order and ensure Islamization takes place in a "regular and wise" (and careful) way. The exaggeration by enemies of Islamization in the media and opposition (eg Benazir Bhutto) is not censored or even opposed by government or government bureaucracy, as they "prove" to Islamic activists on the other side of the problem that "the government enthusiastically executes Nizam-e-Mustapha ". Lack of in-depth knowledge and homegrown Pakistan, foreign press received these reports.
According to Zafar Iqbal Kalanauri, the law under Zia is unstable. He often changes or threatens to change because of differences of opinion among the ruling factions. There is an inconsistency
- Between legal norms and socially observed norms;
- Between legal legal norms and norms applied in practice in court (eg Hadd is difficult to implement because recognition, withdrawal of recognition and strict verification standards make implementation difficult);
- Between different legal legal norms (eg non-compliance with Muslim Family Laws is tolerated by courts but must be strictly punished under Zina Ordinance ). Another example of this contradiction is that the constitution guarantees the equal status of women on the one hand but, on the other hand, they are strongly discriminated against in criminal law.
Post-Zia ul-Haq Islamization
After the death of Zia ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto - daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the ousted and executed Prime Minister - was elected Prime Minister. Although he is a blatant opponent of Islamization of Zia, he does not dismantle the Shari'a Federal Court, the Shari'a Appeal of the Supreme Court, or revoke the Hududan and Ramazan Laws. However, he released all female prisoners convicts in Pakistan who were not convicted of murder (mostly jailed for Hudud Procedure), as one of his first acts after taking power, and generally practicing the "bureaucratic neglect" of Islamization. apparatus.
In October 1990, Qisas and Diyat Ordinance (QDO) were introduced by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. In 1997, during the reign of Nawaz Sharif, Qisas and Diyat Ordinance, now covers all violations of the human body, became the Law of Parliament. As a result, crimes affecting the human body in Pakistan are no longer considered to be a "violation of society or country," but "to the individual." Thus, if the victim or his family so decides, the offender "can walk freely even after committing" murder.
In 1996, the Abolition of the Wrestling Act (endorsed by the Pakistan People's Party Benazir Bhutto), prohibited the punishment of offenders unless convicted hadd. This law has "greatly reduced" examples of corporal punishment.
To revoke the restrictions on the jurisdiction of the Shariat, a "Sharia Law Enforcement" was first announced by Zia in 1988 but not authorized by parliament (and thus allowed to end under Benazir Bhutto), elected to law by parliament under Nawaz Sharif in 1991 the law granted jurisdiction to Sharia-related cases to the Shari'a Federal Court, rather than the less Islamic Courts. But whether the law has more political impact than the law is debated because it maintains a limited standard of Shariah Supremacy. The standard of interpretation for the superior court only permits the decision "to be consistent with the principles of Islamic jurisprudence" when "more than one interpretation" of the law "is possible."
Court decision
In the absence of strong political leadership or social consensus after Zia died, the High Court has become a major, some (Charles Kennedy) saying the "real" determinant of "content and pace of Islamic reform", through their interpretation of their jurisdiction consider what laws and actions "disgusting for Islam". Another scholar (Martin Lau) called the Islamization process in Pakistan largely "led by a judge".
One of the obstacles in how to revoke the activist's perceived law is un-Islamic is the lack of supremacy of shariat in the constitution. Activists have tried to use the Resolution of Objectives with the principle that "Muslims must be enabled to organize their lives in individual and collective terms according to Islamic teachings and requirements as set out in the Qur'an and Sunnah," but the resolution was originally part of > the introduction of the constitution, rather than within the constitution itself, and as a result, the 1973 ruling has declared it "not having the same status or authority" as a "normal written constitution". In 1985, the Constitution was amended and the Resolution of Objectives became the 2-A article of the "Restored Constitution". With this change, Dr. Tanzil-ur-Rahman - an "extremely skilled" Islamic activist and judiciary - argues that regulating Muslim life "in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as defined in the Qur'an and Sunnah," as set forth in article 2A is "supra-constitutional" norma grund law in Pakistan. Supporting the interpretation of Tanzil-ur-Rahman were some of the decisions that were imposed in the late 1980s and early 1990s that disgusted Islamic things such as the payment of court fees, interest on loans, or investments with a fixed rate of return, the requirement that divorce decisions be necessary recorded by the family court to be valid.
The Supreme Court discussed several important issues relating to Islamization around this time period (during Benazir's tenure), including decisions that found un-Islamic provisions in the Pakistani Criminal Code relating to murder, murder and other forms of physical injury, and in large part Zulfikar Land reform Ali Bhutto in 1972 and 1977 (ruling for example that Islam does not approve the compulsory redistribution of wealth or land for the purpose of reducing poverty, but perhaps the goal of poverty alleviation can be achieved.)
However bank interest is still not banned in Pakistan condemning Article 203-B of the constitution (mentioned above) which excludes laws dealing with finance from subordination to sharia. To cope with this situation, Islamic activists seek to convince the public with conferences and a great deal of literature that a flower-free economy is feasible and religiously necessary, to pass a bill in parliament to make a "higher" shari'a against the constitution, and to encourage a higher court to expanding their definition of shariat jurisdiction.
- Faisal Case
In 1990, Tanzil-ur-Rehman was appointed to the Shari'a Federal Court and about a year later (November 1991) issued a "monumental decision" (Faisal vs. Secretary, Ministry of Law) which appeared to be likely to end flowering accounts and accounts in Pakistan.
Faisal's decree prohibits usury completely without exception, overturns 20 federal and provincial financial laws as repugnant to Islam. It defines usury as "any additions, however small, over and above the principal", including markup systems, inflation indexing, value-based payments, not types. It prohibits usury in "production loans" as well as "consumptive" loans. Specifically stated invalidly two interpretations of the Islamic Modernists avoiding strict prohibitions: considering the anti-usury of al-Qur'anic verses (2: 275-8) allegories, and the use of ijtihad (reasoning independent) issues based on ensuring public goods ( maslaha ).
After much stalling by the government and bureaucracy, Faisal's case was upheld in 1999 by the Shariah Appellate Bench in the "Aslam Khaki" decision, with detailed instructions for starting an interest-free economy. Asking that the adoption of the verdict would "create big trouble" for Pakistan's economy by hurting Western-style domestic banking industry and Pakistan's "external financial affairs", the government was given an additional year by the court to enter Islam by Bench.
At the moment, Pervez Musharraf has come to power in a coup d'etat and limits the powers of the court. Two Shariah Lords judges resigned rather than take a new oath of office, and a new petition with a new judge found many "mistakes" in the case of Aslam Khaki and canceled the decision several months earlier.
Protection of Female Law
After 2001, the attention to revise the Hududas Law was granted by a number of government-appointed commissions, a few weeks of televised television debate on the subject. In 2006, President Pervez Musharraf proposed a reform of the ordinance, and in November/December, "Protection of Women (Criminal Procedure of Amendment) Law" was passed and signed. The bill only restricts adultery in the Zina Ordinance, which allows rape to be prosecuted under civil law. This prevents unsuccessful complaints from adultery or rape being converted into allegations of fornication, and adds to the Pakistan Criminal Code a new offense against false allegations of fornication.
Public support
Islamization has strong public support in Pakistan. According to Shajeel Zaidi, a million people attend the funeral of Zia ul Haq because he has given them what they want: more religion. The PEW poll found that 84% of Pakistanis prefer to make legal Shariah law off the ground. According to a Pew 2013 Research Center report, the majority of Pakistani Muslims also support the death penalty for those who leave Islam (62%). In contrast, support for the death penalty for those leaving Islam is only 36% among fellow South Asian Muslim countries of Bangladesh (who share inheritance with Pakistan).
A poll conducted by Gallup Pakistan during January 2011 of over 2,700 men and women in rural and urban areas in the four provinces of the country, found 67% of Pakistanis answer yes to the question In your opinion, the government should taking steps for the "Islamists' of the community 13% of those questioned answered that Pakistan does not need Islamization and 20% did not respond.In 2016, a poll by PEW found that 78% of Pakistanis say that state law must strictly follow the Koran and another 16% of Pakistanis say that the law must follow Islamic values ​​and principles, but not strictly adhering.This is the highest among all Muslim populations surveyed by PEW.
A 2010 poll by the PEW Research Center also found that 87% of Pakistanis consider themselves 'first Muslims' rather than members of their nationalities. This is the highest among all Muslim populations surveyed. In contrast, only 67% in Jordan, 59% in Egypt, 51% in Turkey, 36% in Indonesia and 71% in Nigeria consider themselves the 'first Muslims' rather than their own nationals.
See also
- Islamization
- International Propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism
- Petro-Islam
- Religious defamation laws in Pakistan
- Hududin Ordinance
References
Bibliography
- Jaffrelot, Christophe (2016), The Pakistan Paradox: Instability & amp; Endurance, Oxford University Press.
- Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (1996). Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism . Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Kennedy's
- Islamization of Law and Economy, Case Study in Pakistan . Anis Ahmad, the introduction author. Institute of Policy Studies, The Islamic Foundation. p.Ã, 21. Kennedy, Charles (1996). Kennedy, Charles (1996).
- Islamization of Law and Economy, Case Study in Pakistan . Institute for Policy Studies, Yayasan Islam.
- Lau, Martin (September 1, 2007). "Twenty-Five Years of Hudud Procedure - An Overview". Washington and Lee Law Review . 64 (4): 1292 . Retrieved November 18 2014 .
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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